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The Sociological Expert Witness in a




In a case in which riot-melee felony charges were brought against five teenage mem-
bers of an all-black church in southern Arizona, the legal defense team requested a
sociological expert witness. This paper presents 1) the nature of the request; 2) the
definition of the situation to determine if serving as a sociological expert witness was
an appropriate role; 3) excerpts from the recorded testimony, demonstrating the use
of symbolic interactionist emergent norm theory, as an explanation for the defendents'
behavior; 4) the disposition of the case; 5) the inherent interventionist advocacy role
in expert witnessing; and 6) the implications of sociological intervention by means
of the sociological expert witness role, long the primary province of psychology and
psychiatry.
This writer's career has involved a mix of basic research on intergroup conflict
and conflict resolution processes (e.g., Gordon 1969, 1983) and applied research
analysis involving public policy implications (e.g., Gordon 1965, 1978). Late
in 1982 a formal request was made by a legal defense team, which would involve
a different professional role, that of serving as a sociological expert witness. The
request was to serve as an expert witness in a felony court case in order to
influence its outcome in a specific way, that of innocence rather than guilt for
the defendants (Kerley, 1982).
The case involved a riot on the local high school grounds. Riot-melee felony
charges were made against five teenage male members of the all-black Miracle
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Valley Church located in the southern Arizona community of Sierra Vista in
Cochise County. The Church had transplanted from Chicago several years earlier.
Since the move, church members had had a series of conflicts with white residents
and police prior to this case. The resultant community tension was such that a
change in venue was court ordered so that the jury selection and the disposition
of the case occurred in the city of Tucson in an adjacent county (Varn, 1983b:A).
The case touched both my interracial research interests and my personal
value commitment to racial justice. The latter interest related to my humanist
commitment, influenced by the works of longtime colleague Thomas Ford Hoult
(1975), Lee (1973), Lynd (1939), and others who advocate humanistic socio-
logical intervention. In recent years, this focus has coalesced increasingly into
the practice of clinical sociology (Straus, 1979). Yet, with no prior expert wit-
nessing experience, I was not initially clear why I had been asked to serve in
the capacity of sociological expert witness for the defense. In this respect I
pointed out to the defense attorneys that there were highly capable sociologists
with expertise in race relations and collective behavior at the University of
Arizona. One of the attorneys, James Kerley, noted that his inquiries of faculty
and students at Arizona State University resulted in the request to me.
Before making the commitment to serve as an expert witness I requested
background material to help determine if the alleged facts in the case war-
ranted—from both sociological expertise and value orientation perspectives—my
entering the case. For this purpose I requested and received a number of available
materials on the case including 1) Grand Jury testimony and other depositions
supportive of both the defense and prosecution positions; 2) newspaper accounts
of the case from the time of the April 20, 1982, riot on the high school grounds;
3) a computer printout on the latest census data for Cochise County, the locale,
including racial composition; and 4) flyers which had been known to circulate
in the community depicting church members in racially derogatory terms.
Given my ongoing administrative research and instructional commitments,
there was not time for field work investigation at the riot site in Cochise County,
located about 140 miles from my university. I was able to interview a white
former resident of the county who represented a text book company and visited
the Arizona State campus. She noted in some detail a number of interpersonal
conflicts between members of the Miracle Valley, all-black, Church and Anglo
members of the county. As noted in newspaper accounts, she confirmed the
emotionally charged negative view of the fundamentalist church held by many
Anglos in Cochise County.
I had to rely initially on the supplied materials which documented a number
of conflict situations between members of the church and other community
residents. Beyond information directly involving the case or its immediate back-
ground, I also employed statistical analysis as suggested by Loewen in his Social
Science in the Courtroom (1982). This included a review of U.S. census and
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state data on Cochise County. It was of interest that the economic and educational
level in the county of the black Miracle Valley Church members was similar to
Hispanics in the county and below not only the predominant Anglo population
but also below that of several hundred other blacks who had lived in the county
for a longer time. Other statistical data employed in preparation for the trial
related primarily to the literature on racial stereotyping, covering over a half
century from the early studies of the 1920s and 1930s (e.g., Bogardus, 1968;
viz., Katz and Braly, 1933) to recent summary assessments (e.g., Simpson and
Yinger, 1972:139-164; Vander Zanden, 1983:19-30). The stereotyping trends
showed diminished but continuing pejorative perceptions of blacks, and partic-
ularly low-income blacks.
Following several weeks' review of the supplied and available materials,
including details of the riot, it appeared to me that the charges against the five
black young men were ill founded and constituted an injustice. Consequently,
I agreed to the request to serve as a sociological expert witness. This was done
not without some degree of concerned awareness that this would generate con-
siderable local media coverage on a controversial matter and place me in a
courtroom situation in which I had no prior experience. With a supportive wife
and children, who thought this was an interesting topic of occasional discussion
with their friends, I forwarded my professional vita to the defense attorneys,
who sent it to the court for expert witness review. With the court approval which
followed, I was committed to officially becoming part of the court proceedings.
Defining the Situation: Considerations and Constraints
My review of the materials led to an assessment that the riot on the high school
grounds was precipitated by actions of school officials and police more than that
of the five black teens as charged. However, there were cautions in this assess-
ment, including the limited time available to me to review the material prior to
the March 1983 trial. As I noted to the defense attorneys, continuing collection
of relevant materials could potentially alter my assessment of the riot. My tes-
timony, while likely to support the defendants' positions, would involve a so-
ciological interpretation of the underlying and precipitant causes of the riot-melee
just as though I were in a classroom attempting to present and assess all sides.
Along the lines delineated by Straus (1984), based on the materials available
to me, it was my definition of the situation which determined my agreement to
engage in a sociological intervention effort as an expert witness on behalf of the
defendants. The sociological task appeared similar to the one experienced by
Kai Erikson, detailed in Everything in Its Path: Destruction of Community in
the Buffalo Creek Flood (1976). He was called upon by attorneys for flooded
out Buffalo Creek miners in a case in which it was alleged that the mining
company practices precipitated the destructive flood. Unlike the usual sociolog-
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ical approach in which a study area is selected to shed light on a subject of
interest to support or to put into question a larger generalization, the opposite
process occurred. As Erikson noted: "My assignment on Buffalo Creek . . . was
to sift through the store of available sociological knowledge to see what light
it might shed on a single human event, and this, clearly, reverses the normal
order of social science research" (1976:12). Similarly, my task was to draw
upon sociological theoretical insights, based upon empirical research on the
nature of human response in collective intergroup conflict situations, and apply
these to this Miracle Valley church members case.
About three months preparation time was available before the scheduled
trial. It was time to develop a viable strategy before my expert witness testimony,
which would include cross examination by defense and prosecuting attorneys
before judge and jury. A strategy session was arranged in the Tucson offices of
two of the defense attorneys, Armand Salese and James Kerley, where they
would have ready access to any needed documentary materials.
An initial topic was my expert witness fee. At the suggestion of an attorney
friend I requested, and it was agreed, that I receive compensation prior to my
courtroom testimony. The point of my request and concern was to avoid the
implication, should the issue ever arise in or out of court, that my being com-
pensated was tied to the nature and effectiveness of my testimony for the defense.
Once this matter was resolved we proceeded to the substantive case strategy.
The attorneys noted that the state prosecuting attorneys would call a psy-
chologist. While they noted that sociologists served less frequently as expert
witnesses, we agreed that the interracial collective conflict nature of the case
lent itself to the saliency of a sociological interpretation. The judicial legitimacy
of sociological research had been established in the 1954 Brown decision. In
that benchmark case extensive use was made of social scientific, including
sociological, research findings in the Supreme Court's reversal of the 1896 Plessy
"separate but equal" doctrine.
The attorneys informed me that no written statement could be read by
witnesses nor could any notes be taken onto the stand. They noted that it was
important to communicate effectively with the jury as a small attentive audience.
In this they stressed a generic point made by Dorran that an expert witness had
to appear both knowledgeable and credible in her or his interpretation of the case
facts (1982:29).
The attorneys noted that a central problem was credibility before the jury.
They observed that the jury was likely to be initially more impressed with such
prosecuting witnesses as school administrative officials and police officers. They
further noted that this credibility 'would likely be the case even with white high
school student witnesses than with the defendants and other black student wit-
nesses, all of whom were members of the Miracle Valley Church and one of
whom had been suspended from the high school where the riot took place.
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This raised the issue of jury "overbelief' in established authority, whereby
there is a tendency to believe such authorities independent of contradictory
evidence or statements (Egeth and McCloskey, 1984; Loftus, 1979). Given the
conflicting eye witness testimony, and my not having been on the scene of the
events, the task in court was to present what Wells (1984) refers to as a credible
"probabilistic" case that the school ground rioting was not precipitated by the
five defendants. The strategy designed to accomplish this included planned efforts
to denote what Lofland (1976) refers to as the differing subcultural "worlds."
These very different social worlds would affect the differing interpretations of
the riot events by the black students in contrast to the school and police authorities
or of the large majority of white students on the scene.
Before beginning systematic preparation for my expert witness testimony,
the attorneys stressed that to be an effective expert witness a well grounded
theory that could apply to explaining the events in the case was necessary. My
response related to what Gusfield (1978) aptly describes as the cafeteria of
sociological paradigms from which to choose. I noted that the nature of the case
lent itself to a micro symbolic-interactionist situational case interpretation rather
than more macro, and for the jury more abstract, conflict or functional interpretive
explanations. After discussion, the attorneys concurred that a theoretical inter-
pretation of the riot events would best focus on the situational communications
and other symbolic interactions that appeared to have occurred on the scene. I
noted that this approach would not negate bringing to bear larger cultural, in-
stitutional, and historical influences on the behavior of the defendants.
On the Stand: Point-Counter-Point
The task of sociologically interpreting the cause of the high school riot-melee
was performed in the few months prior to my court testimony in a Pima County
Superior Court, March 25, 1983. There was no dispute that a riot-melee had in
fact occurred, but there was a dispute on what precipitated it.
In general terms, the relatively low income, fundamentalist, all-black nature
of the church, originally from the distant urban setting of Chicago, was viewed
as likely having the effect of stirring among white residents long-held stereo-
typical fears of blacks. Such fears among whites in American society had long
been documented in the social distance studies of Bogardus (1968), extending
back to the 1920s, and the racial and ethnic stereotyping studies of Katz and
Braly (1933), Gilbert (1951), Karlinsetal. (1969), and others. More specifically,
statements by church members and of white residents indicated that the church
members tended to view themselves as morally superior to most of those in the
predominantly white community. A local Arizona Daily Star (Tucson) news
article referred to the settlement of the Miracle Valley Church as akin to being
"invaded by aliens" (Varn, 1983a). Hand printed flyers had been reproduced
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and distributed widely in the community in which church members were char-
acterized in pejorative terms such as "coons." Defense attorneys had photos of
a "Children at Play" sign placed by the government in the road before the
church, on which the standard depiction of a young girl playing was painted in
bright colors with large lips and other stereotypical Negroid features.
Given this background, two major sociological theories were drawn upon
for interpretation of the events. These were 1) the Thomas Theorem self-fulfilling
prophecy on false beliefs leading to real consequences (Thomas, 1931); and 2)
Turner's emergent norm theory on how prior values and attitudes can influence
the emergence of norm activation in cases of collective behavior, including
collective conflict (Turner 1964, 1967; Turner and Killian, 1972). Thus, my
approach was not so much to draw upon macro conflict or functional sociological
perspectives but rather to concentrate on the Cooley-Mead-Blumer school of
symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969).
The testimony lasted from 9:40 a.m. until noon with a 15-minute recess
during that period. The jury consisted of six women and four men, with the only
ethnic differentiation being that one of the men appeared Hispanic. The pattern
of cross-examination established by the judge was to begin with a defense attorney
followed by a prosecuting attorney and ending again with a defense attorney
with a final few questions again by a prosecuting attorney. Initial unease at being
in such an unusual formal court setting was alleviated when the defense attorney
began the cross-examination by asking basic biographical background infor-
mation such as residence, educational degree, and university employment, and
noting a number of my publications in the areas of interracial relations and
conflict analysis.
Drawing on the recorded court record (Superior Court, Pima County,
1983:5-6), the strategy of employing the Thomas Theorem and the emergent
norm process to interpret the riot event can be seen in the defending attorney's
cross-examination.
Q: Sir, can you tell me whether there are generally accepted explanatory theories
dealing with behavior of individuals in a riotous or melee situation?
A: Yes, there is a well established theoretical framework called symbolic in-
teraction, which is now over three-quarters of a century old. It began initially
at the University of Michigan under Charles Horton Cooley, but became part
of the Chicago School, sociological school, early in the century and, as it
has developed over the years, part of symbolic interaction theory that relates
to crowd behavior, [in] unstructured situation[s], is referred to as emergent
norm theory, and part of that is related to what is called the
Thomas . . . theorem . . . related to W.I. Thomas, who died about 40 years
ago. He was a sociologist at the University of Chicago, and based his studies
on the Polish community, but there have been many studies since [his]. The
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emergent norm theory has been codified and employed in many [collective]
situations by Ralph Turner, who is out of the Chicago School; he is at UCLA,
and past president of the American Sociological Association.
The defense attorney then reviewed the case in which a black teenage
member of the Miracle Valley Church had been suspended from high school and
upon coming onto school grounds during the lunch hour did not leave the campus
immediately upon being requested to do so by the Assistant Principal. When
police were then called and some of the black student's friends convened along
with other students, a crowd developed. Conflicting testimony was reviewed on
when and how pushing and shoving began the riot process. The defense attorney
concluded with the following statement and question which afforded a socio-
logically interpretive response about the relevance of emergent norm theory to
the case situation (Superior Court, Pima County, 1983:9–11):
Q: The defendants have testified to a fear of the police, a fear of the situation.
Based upon your training and experience, and expertise in the area of race
relations, riot control, or riots, can you give any explanatory theories that
you are aware of in the field of sociology to help the jury understand the
behavior of the participants in the riot-melee?
A: I believe so ... What emergent norm theory does, and it has been
tested . . . in many different situations involving crowd behavior, melees,
other kinds of confrontations, and a great deal of that literature would suggest,
given the set of circumstances, there would be high probabilities of certain
actions flowing, and basically what the theoretical framework would hold
is that when the routine of easy interaction is broken, and people are not
moving along in normative expectations of behavior, then what occurs, just
as if a fire broke out ... [it] would be a situation in which people would
have to develop a normative response to this unstructured situation. Clearly
the routine was broken in the school grounds and the nature of the school
authorities' social control mechanism that was used [initially calling in the
police] appeared to be quite unusual, which would have influenced the kind
of emergent norm, that is, what kinds of attitudes and behaviors would be
elicited once the police came onto the scene.
I am quite sure this (the riot) isn't what the principal . . . or assistant
principal . . . meant in terms of [desired] consequences, but in terms of
emergent norm theory, if you communicate to individuals in such a way that
there is a break in the normative routine, the values that come into play are
based on their past experiences.
At this point the prosecuting attorney entered the beginning of several
objections, arguing that as the expert witness was not present during the riot-
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melee, he could not interpret the actual riot events (p. 11), a point not stressed
when the prosecuting team later brought a psychologist expert witness to interpret
the riot events. The questioning by the defense turned on what basis I held the
view that the principal's office's call initially to the police rather than to parents
or church authorities was not normal school control behavior. The defense asked,
in respect to an immediate call to police when there was no violent confrontation
rather than to parents or guardians (p. 13), "How would these individuals react
to that, how would they view it?"
A: In my research in Oak Park [Michigan], which involved integration
with . . . Carver . . . which was an all black district at the time . . . in the
early 1960s . . . It was integrated into the Oak Park high school system,
which was a middle class system that never had any blacks there before.
When there were incidents that occurred that were of concern to the [high]
school authorities, the principal, assistant principal, school teachers, given
the polarization and the community hostili ty to these
blacks . . . would . . . attempt to ... diffuse the situation [by] initially at-
tempt[ing] to contact parents or other guardians or authorities, because by
doing that they took the necessary steps . . . to diffuse the situation, which
they did successfully there . . . by engaging in that approach they had sym-
bolically communicated to the black students that . . . the authorities were
making an attempt to resolve issues and only at the end of that . . . procedure
did police come in ... the black student response tended to be coopera-
tive . . . As I understand it, based on both the [research] literature and police
practice and school authority practice . . . that is the general approach . . . and
if ... not taken initially . . . the consequences are very likely to increase
the probability of some kind of confrontation . . . in trying to control an
interaction with school authority and these black students.
Q: Why, absent that kind of normative contact from the school officials to either
responsible people for the kids or parents, how then do the students view
that break from the norm [i.e., contacting police before contacting parents
or other guardians when no violence is occurring]?
A: Well, that gets into the . . . Thomas Theorem . . . [on] . . . "Stereotyping
and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies" [sic] . . . there is nationally documented
stereotyping data on the general negative images that whites often have
towards blacks about being aggressive, about being ignorant, about being
dangerous, and unless there are communication steps that have been taken
to short-circuit that . . . imagery, it would be highly unusual for blacks to
view [police] authorities in a crowd situation . . . in anything but a threat-
ening . . . way . . . increasing the probability of a panic reaction . . . it
appeared to me that is what was precipitated. (pp. 13–16)
SOCIOLOGICAL EXPERT WITNESS 115
This line of questioning continued with documented reference by the defense
attorney that out of the predominantly white teenage crowd of about 500 had
come pejorative shouts including "nigger" and "kill them," to which the de-
fendants had responded in kind heightening crowd tensions among the several
black teens, police, and others. The riot, according to police testimony, began
when first one and ultimately four more black teens resisted arrest (Miscellaneous
Offense Report, 1982). The escape efforts resulted in shoving, pushing, and
what was charged to be a riot-melee. Continuing the questioning and my drawing
upon Turner's emergent norm theory:
Q: In other words, the actions of trying to get away, of backing up, of even
using offensive terminology, was protective as opposed to aggressive?
A: That is what appears to me, and I think it was precipitated by the view that
there was high probability of being under attack. That would be more likely
to occur in a homogeneous racial or ethnic grouping that is in context of
what they perceive to be a hostile environment. That is not unusual to
blacks . . . and in the history of ethnic relations, there have been rioting of
Irish Catholics in New York, and of Jews, Greeks, Italians and others over
the last century, so that is a fairly common kind of response." (pp. 17-18)
Prosecution Counter Cross-Examination: Attacking the Emergent Norm
Defensive Reaction Thesis and Setting the Case for An Individual
Aggressive Behavior Thesis
The prosecuting attorney had the task of attempting to negate the relevance of
the Thomas Theorem and emergent norm theory to the case with its accoutrements
of identifying past attitudes and behaviors as instrumental in the behavior of the
black teens. On the table next to the prosecuting attorney were two of my books,
A City in Racial Crisis (1971) about the 1967 Detroit race riot and Sociology
and American Social Issues (1978), a text about national social issues and policy
options.
The cross-examination began by attempting to denote that these books and
other witness publications, and sociological research generally, were not about
blacks living in Cochise County in southern Arizona where the riot-melee had
occurred. He further attempted to characterize sociology, in contrast to psy-
chology, as concerned with social behavior rather than individual behavior and
as such irrelevant to this case of specific charges against five individuals. Thus,
my first task as a sociological expert witness was to try to establish the relevance
of sociology to such a criminal case. From the testimony:
Q: Okay. Let's talk about sociology a litle bit. Isn't it true that sociology is the
study of group behavior and group interactions? Is that true?
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A: It is ... and it [sociology] often involves groups, but it gets involved in
interpersonal relations. It could be a dyadic relationship, . . involved in
mass public opinion and collective behavior, which is beyond a group, but
certainly groups are one of our major areas of focus, that is correct.
Q: You are not a psycholgogist or psychiatrist?
A: No ... I am a sociologist.
Q: So, primarily, you do not study individual behavior, is that correct?
A: There is a branch of sociology that [involves] symbolic interaction . . . This
particular area, which is one of my theoretical specialties, overlaps with an
area called social psychology. For example, emergent norm theory and the
Thomas Theorem are employed by psychologists, Mark Schneider [whose
stereotyping work had been cited] . . . is a psychologist . . . he used the
Thomas Theorem. Thomas was a sociologist. The Princeton [stereotyping]
studies by Katz and Braly, those were conducted by psychologists . . . We
have courses in our department on social psychology. That is one of our
examination areas . . . it involves individual behavior in a social context.
It is what is called microtheory, focusing on individuals in often small group
situations, (pp. 20–21)
After several more attempts, addressing me as "Doctor" consistently, to
denote that sociologists were not qualified to judge individual behavior as normal
or abnormal—in respect to the "normative" in emergent norm theory—the
prosecuting attorney went on:
Q: Okay. Sociologist, you are a social scientist, is that true?
A: Yes.
Q: You deal with statistics?
A: That is one technique. There are other methodological techniques I em-
ploy . . . interviews and observations and field analysis as well . . .
Q: Would you say it is a precise science?
A: . . . like economics . . . we deal in probabilities and we can predict many
behaviors with a high degree of accuracy, but within a margin of error . . .
Q: Okay. Doctor, so what you're saying is that your analysis of this particular
situation on April 20 is . . . based upon sociological theory and probabilities?
Is that correct?
A: And over a half century of research findings in similar situations.
Q: Isn't it true that many social scientists, sociologists, may have different
opinions as to particular group interactions as applied to fact situations?
A: You can find in any discipline . . . trained people who will dissent from the
general theoretical and research finding consensus . . . but Jonathan Turner,
no relation to Ralph Turner, has a widely used . . . theory textbook. He cites
Ralph Turner's emergent norm theory . . .
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Q: Doctor, you are not answering my question.
Defense: I object, he is answering the question. [This was one of a series of
objections and cross objections.]
The Court: Let him finish.
A: Professor [Jonathan] Turner, University of California at Riverside, cites this
as one of the most widely used theories and accepted theories because it is
so well established empirically . . . in terms of theoretical acceptance, Rob-
ert Merton, who is at Columbia University, and a member of the National
Academy of Sciences, in his social problems textbook . . . cited the Thomas
Theorem as the most influential [sociological] theoretical [concept] we have
developed in the 20th century, and it applies to emergent norm theory and
symbolic interactions, so it is a widely accepted theoretical framework. (pp.
24–26)
After a series of questions about not being witness to the riot-melee, the
prosecuting questioning shifted to why other minorities—Jews, Poles, among
others noted—have not rioted as have blacks:
Q: Okay, Doctor, what I would like to do is ask you precisely why it is that you
talk about white/black relationships in a situation that happened on Fry Bou-
levard, as opposed to other minorities?
A: Situations with other minorities have not nearly the history or the exten-
siveness of the black experience in American society. We made tremendous
changes in attitudes and laws in the last 20 years approximately, but there
really is a history of over 300 years of official hostility toward blacks. That
isn't changed in terms of socialization within one generation, and the depth
of confrontation is much deeper in relationship to black/white relationships
than to most other minority groupings. (p. 31)
The prosecuting attorney turned to the potential for violence and asked why
school authorities have to wait for violence to occur before calling in police. My
response, employing the emergent normative process and citing a source familiar
to school authorities:
A: That gets back to a point I was raising before . . . if the initial communication
had been with parents or church authorities, even if there had been no
response, if that had been communicated to the [black] students, in this kind
of situation, I think . . . the likelihood of ... panic . . . would have been
quite different. In terms of school authorities, there is a great deal of literature
that has been widely used, the Carnegie Foundation report called Crisis in
the Classroom came out in 1970 . . . by Charles Silberman . . . and there
is a great deal of treatment [in it] of polarized interracial situations in school
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settings. I cite that because that became a best seller and has been standard
usage in school systems around the country. (p. 42)
The prosecuting attorney then personalized the questioning by referring to
the delinquent school record of one of the suspended black students and inquired
about how I would react if my family was in the situation:
Q: Do you have any children, Doctor?
A: Three.
Q: Would you want your children going to a school where the school admin-
istrator would wait to call the police before [violence occurred]. (p. 45)
A: [Drawing upon prior sociological points of analysis:] I would want school
authorities to take the most effective action to make sure that they contacted
the home and church authorities. I would not want my children in a situation
where there is a high probability of a major confrontation that could produce
violence . . . I would feel much more secure if my children were in a school
where school authorities understood and went through what I believe to be
the normal procedures. I think what occurred here appeared to me a more
dangerous approach. (pp. 45–46)
After additional questions, the prosecuting attorney concluded by challeng-
ing the application of sociological theory to the unobserved riot-melee:
Q: Doctor, when we're talking about [sociological] theory, aren't you really just
speculating as to what happened on April 20?
A: No, there are speculative theories that are not research based . . . Symbolic
interaction theories, which is the large framework, and emergent norm theory
are much more grounded in actual observations of many different crowd
situations. (p. 56)
This ended the main prosecuting cross-examination. The defense team was
afforded the opportunity to reexamine.
Defense Counter Cross-Examination: Attempting to Reestablish the
Saliency of the Sociological Emergent Norm Defensive Behavior Thesis
The first question by a defense attorney member, a second member of the defense
team, and my response set the tone for a stream of questions and responses
denoting the defensive, escape nature of the black teenagers' behavior rather
than being aggressive riot-melee behavior as charged:
Q: Dr. Gordon, there were some questions asked, I believe in cross-examination,
about your testimony about a panic situation developing here. I would ask
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you if you could explain that in terms of what you understood from the police
reports that you have read in the development of the situation, the devel-
opment of the melee up to and including the leaving in the car, going off
at high speeds to Miracle Valley [by the five charged black teens], with an
emphasis on what you mean and why the panic?
A: Yes. There is a specific part of the research literature on panic. That is why
under certain circumstances people are likely to panic and why they are not
[under other circumstances]. In a way, it goes back to, I think, what Justice
Holmes noted in famous terms, that one can't yell "Fire" in a closed theatre
when there is no fire, because of the recognition that might induce
panic . . . Since that statement there has been a lot of research on why people
do or don't panic, because we know in some kinds of situations . . . no panic
occurs . . . panic generally occurs when either there is no fearful situation
in terms of ... an unstructured . . . if a mine collapses and people . . . realize
that all they have to do is just walk out of an open space there is no panic.
There tends to be no panic when people are caught in a totally helpless
situation where there doesn't appear to be any avenue of escape . . . It is
between these two polar situations that you have a high probability of panic
occurring . . . [after citing instances] . . . [people may] panic when they
believe they are in a state of threat or very likely to be, and that the only
way to get out of that situation is if they escape and they see some circum-
stances in which it may be possible to escape. (pp. 58-59)
[Note: The charged students had confiscated an auto and had driven it back
toward their church in Miracle Valley.]
The last set of defense attorney questions attempted to counter the prose-
cuting argument that application of theory to an unobserved phenomenon could
be scientifically, including sociologically, justified:
Q: Doctor, I have one last question. Do you know if anybody, any human being
has landed on Mars or Venus?
A: We have landed on the moon.
Q: Do you know whether astronomers study Mars and Venus without ever
having been there.
A: Oh, yes, certainly.
Q: And obviously you haven't landed on [defendants] Lonnie Hayes and Ricky
Lamar, and you can still talk about theories, can't you?
A: Yes, sir. (pp. 69-70)
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Case Disposition and Expert Witness Implications for Sociological
Intervention
The five black teenage defendants were found innocent of felony-rioting charges
by the jury, but three were convicted of assaulting police as they resisted arrest
and attempted escape (Varn, 1983c). It was the assessment of defense attorneys
that the two and a half hours of sociological expert witness testimony was an
influencing factor on the jury's negation of the most serious charges, with the
potential of long years in prison for the defendants. It is also possible that the
testimony of the prosecuting expert witness, psychologist Al Silberman, influ-
enced the finding of conviction on resisting arrest, even though there was no
finding of felonious conduct that would have justified arrest of the teens.
In a brief meeting with the expert witness psychologist after our case tes-
timony, we both concurred in empathizing with the black teens who were caught
in a strained and hostile environment. His court testimony included the assess-
ment that the charged assault behavior by the black students ' 'could have been
protective behavior, but against an officer of the law, it's criminal behavior"
(Varn, 1983a:B1). Our differences were in the relative weighting of provocation
which precipitated their escape behavior and which became the focus of jury
judgment.
The case pointed up some difficulties and future prospects for sociological
intervention to influence behavioral outcomes by means of the sociological expert
witness role. First, an expert witness authorizes the contending side to do the
same. Thus, a situation is created in which expert witnesses compete for per-
suasiveness. Potentially, this could involve two or more sociologists contending
with each other. Second, while psychiatrists and psychologists have long been
accepted in the courtroom as expert witnesses, this is a relatively new role for
sociologists. This appeared to be part of the nature of the prosecuting cross-
examination challenging the relevance of sociological research to criminal
charges against individuals in specific unobserved cases. Further, the judge in
the case finally instructed the jury to disregard all expert testimony that dealt
with any aspects of the case beyond the riot-melee. Still, this was after allowing
a total of five hours of such testimony.
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